Gerry Hassan

The Scotsman, February 18th 2012

Scotland has been all over the world news these last few weeks: the independence debate, David Cameron’s high profile intervention, and of course the saga of Glasgow Rangers FC.

What has been missing from the Scottish debate is an engagement with the wider environment beyond Scotland, both in relation to the UK and internationally. In times it almost seems as if the debate is being undertaken, irrespective of opinion, in a vacuum.

The prevalent Scottish debate amongst politicians, commentators and seasoned observers is to talk of Scotland in isolation. Whether unionist, nationalist or neither, many people embrace, often without understanding it, an ‘independence of the mind’.

This imaginary Scotland is a self-determining territory which operates without much relation to the British state. The crises of the euro zone and European Union go unstated. And even more fundamentally, the global economic crisis, and that of Western enlightened liberalism and social democracy, usually pass without comment.

There is a political subtlety and ahistorical nature in this. The journey Scotland is currently on, and which post-Cameron, everyone seems to be signing up to, of more powers and self-government, isn’t as many assume, cost-free.

Scotland in the union has had to undertake over the years a delicate balancing act between Edinburgh and London. Scotland pre-devolution, under numerous Secretaries of State for Scotland and governments has enjoyed quite a bit of clout in relation to Westminster and Whitehall. It had a Cabinet minister; it had a Whitehall government department; more importantly, it had political relationships and leverage.

Over the post-war period and particularly post-1979, this carefully balanced system began to break down. Scots saw their interests and wishes being less and less effectively addressed and dealt with.

This built up pressure for change and was a contributory factor in the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 which gave us a greater say over domestic policy. It also affected this balancing act, weakening the Scots voice and influence in London; the Scotland Office was diminished,  as was the standing of the post of Secretary of State for Scotland. More crucially, Scotland was basically forgotten across Whitehall, seen as having less of a British voice and being more detached and doing its own thing.

This set of dynamics of Scotland accruing more powers, but losing voice and power in the corridors of British government has to be factored into current debates. If we are to explore the prospect and detail of full fiscal autonomy we have to understand that complex trade-offs are at work here, and that such change would entail a fundamental dilution of Scottish status down south. This would happen formally with the continued reduction of Scottish MPs at Westminster, and consideration of ‘English votes for English laws’, but even more at the level of how British government departments worked.

Then there is the issue of how we relate to London and the South East, even if independent. Some anti-independence voices argue when will this Scottish debate ever end. The answer to this concern is that part of this debate is about how we deal with the UK as a deeply unequal, unevenly developed society, and central to this is London and the South East.

Even an independent Scotland would have a relationship with the world city London and South East. We will always have to face living on the same island the challenge of how we relate to London and prevent wealth and power being over-concentrated in it. This is part of what implicitly drives the debate now, and will go on whatever our constitutional status.

Then there are the external dynamics which will play a part in shaping Scotland’s future. What happens if Greece is unable to implement the current austerity programme, defaults, or is driven out of the euro by the European Commission?

What would occur if the euro itself goes down, or perhaps a more likely scenario, fragments into a core euro zone of Germany-France and a few others, and an outer set of states who have to leave, led by the unfortunately titled PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain)?

Then there is one of the great watershed moments. What impact would British withdrawal or serious detachment from the European Union have on Scotland? This is at least a possibility after Cameron’s disengagement from the European Union project at the end of last year, and use of the British veto.

Any debate on this has to frame that Scottish and English public opinion are not that different on this; both are Eurosceptic. Yet while English political debates are shaped by fear of Brussels encroachments on ‘the British way of life’, Scottish politicians are comfortable living not just in a union, but a multiplicity of unions, which involve sharing sovereignties and are more aware of Europe as a positive.

Then there is the final other external variable visible at the moment: the prospect of a US backed Israeli attack on Iran to thwart its supposed nuclear weapons ambitions. Such an attack would have devastating effects on the region, peace and would one surmises be carried out with the backing of the UK Government.

If this was to occur and the worst consequences flowed from it, this would have huge impact on the shape of the Scottish debate to put it mildly.

In these turbulent times it is highly likely that external events will frame and shape a significant part of, and possibly the outcome of the Scottish debate.

The first two Euro issues would on balance probably deal a blow to ambitions of independence. But the second two would bring to the fore the problematic character of the British state, its isolationism in Europe and fanatical pro-Atlanticism, and overall aid the argument for independence.

Scotland is not an island. Despite the rhetoric used by some unionist campaigners no one is seriously proposing ‘separatism’ and ‘separation’.

Scotland is connected to and shaped by the external world, and part of the Scottish debate is about a large part of the Scots public having a lack of trust and faith in believing the British government and state has the interest or ability to look after and protect the values and interests people believe in north of the border.

It would be a sign of welcome maturity if increasingly our politicians and other leaders would position Scotland in a wider context, talking about London and our relationship to it, the British state, and crucially, the wider world. Maybe we could all live up to that age old retort of Winnie Ewing many years ago, ‘Stop the world, Scotland wants to get on!’

Gerry Hassan

Bella Caledonia, February 17th 2012

This is not another article on football. The Rangers crisis has filled the airwaves and media this week. For the second time this year Scotland has gone international and viral, spreading across the globe connecting the diaspora and other interested parties.

Many people ask how this came to pass with Rangers. All kinds of reasons and conspiracies are proposed: pro-Rangers bias, anti-Celtic opinion, Protestantism/anti-Catholicism, and the carve up of ‘the Old Firm’ duopoly.

We need to lift our heads from thinking of football on its own and see this in the context of Scotland. For what the Rangers story tells us is that Scottish society has a problem with power, its relationship to it, and how they hold it to account, scrutinise and inquire into its actions.

This can be seen across Scottish public life from football to business to politics. The Rangers saga has festered for many years. David Murray’s massive overspending and the bludgeoning of the club’s debts were very public and known to be unsustainable. Craig Whyte’s credentials were widely questioned when he took over.

What was missing from mainstream Scotland, from politicians, business experts and media, was a detailed questioning, calling to account and forensic examination of what was going on.

We have seen this before. The banking crisis and collapse of RBS saw a once powerful global institution and the leadership of Fred Goodwin go unchallenged, be feted and revered by our political classes and elites. There was an even more pervasive silence on RBS before the crash, and after, it hasn’t been much better, with little systematic analysis north of the border, beyond pillorying ‘Fred the Shred’.

Then there is how we do political scandals and corruption. In the last two years there have been a series of episodes that bubbled away in Labour North Lanarkshire and Glasgow City Council which burst into public view after the resignation of Stephen Purcell. And then silence, despite the murky lid being lifted off a world of dodgy property deals, land sales and council activities.

Some say this is the fault of the mainstream media and a lack of resources, courage and imagination in investigative reporting. In this account, with its power and status a particularly guilty culprit is BBC Scotland which hasn’t broken a major news story or challenged institutional power for years.

Some think it is cultural and all part of ‘village Scotland’, of being a small country where movers and shakers know each other.

Another view comes from academic Jean Barr who argues that Scots have an absence of understanding what she calls ‘relational space’. By this she means where people come from, who is involved in a debate or decision, and who is missing. A typical example would be Andrew Marr blithely commenting that ‘all of Edinburgh’ was involved in the salon discussions of Enlightenment time; a comment which beggars belief.

Others including writer and campaigner Andy Wightman have made the case that we have a strange lack of curiosity over who has power. This seems inexplicable in a nation with its proud tradition of radicalism and land reform and which saw Thomas Johnston’s piercing ‘Our Scots Noble Families’ published just over one hundred years ago and sell thousands. Maybe it says something about what has happened to that radical imagination.

What we have seen with the Rangers case, and didn’t with RBS and political corruption, is the power of social media, bloggers and new sites of expertise and commentary emerging which have forensically asked difficult questions and dug up inconvenient facts. We cannot argue that some of our silences are mainly due to legal constraints as is often when individual bloggers and sites have little resources and could be shut down by those with money and power.

This seems to point to the beginning of a seismic change in society; football ignites emotions and passions and creates a community as well as creating divisions, that so many people are prepared to spend their time and skills challenging those in power. Perhaps we need to get as serious about some of the great challenges facing society as we do about what is after all only a game (plus identity, history, folklore).

There are also issues of leadership and how we revere certain kinds of authority, some formal, some charismatic. David Murray and Fred Goodwin were buccaneer capitalists loved by some as the good times rolled who brooked little dissent; and who are now conveniently scapegoated after disaster.

Yet Murray and Goodwin were products of their age, of the hurricane capitalism of the last few decades, short-termism of British business, and lack of checks and balances in corporate governance. It is convenient to just pretend it is about individuals, rather than cultures, values and structures.

If we were to broaden out what has happened we would see that this is a Scottish expression of a very modern condition: what the thinker Colin Crouch has called post-democracy, namely the collusion of political, corporate and media elites to support their inter-woven mutual interests.

Examples of this would include the British political elites and Rupert Murdoch’s News International’s incestuous relationship until last summer which saw successive Labour and Conservative leaderships demean themselves at the Murdoch court. In Scotland, all four of the mainstream parties could not contain themselves declaring the nation ‘open for business’ when Donald Trump declared he wanted to build his ‘world class’ golf course in the sand dunes of Menie (until the recent fallout).

If Scotland is to have a meaningful debate over the next few years, one of the central issues we are going to have to face is how to talk about, challenge and investigate power.

That means confronting some of the cosy assumptions of the people’s version of Scotland; it means opening the doors on clubland, establishment Scotland and it means questioning the kind of corporate groupthink which laid behind the felling of two of the great institutions of public life, Rangers and RBS. It means getting rid of the ‘too big to fail’ assumptions which prevailed in banking, and which can now be seen with Rangers; that corporate orthodoxy is actually anti-business and anti-competition.

Magnus Linklater wrote twenty years ago that ‘it would be very hard to talk about a Scottish establishment’. It is that kind of assumption in its many forms that we need to not let go unquestioned. Instead, we desperately need to care about who exercises power and how it acts across our lives, and inquire, challenge and excavate in areas other than football.

This is about something fundamental: it is about making self-government real, relevant and radical, and about starting to make Scotland the modern democracy which is so frequently invoked, but not practised across wide swathes of society.

Gerry Hassan

Open Democracy, February 17th 2012

David Cameron came north to Scotland speaking with the authority of Prime Minister of the UK and the status of leading a party with one MP out of 59 Westminster representatives.

He delivered an important speech and intervention and met with First Minister Alex Salmond; this can be seen as part of the long campaign and positioning of each man and side seeing himself as a long distance runner, pacing themselves, sizing up and trying to get the better of their opponent.

Cameron’s speech was in its tone and content, thoughtful and astute. It was in the view of Joyce Macmillan, ‘the strongest explicitly unionist speech made in Britain since the 1950s’ (1). That may seem an overstatement, but it is one of the most nuanced interventions made in Scotland for many a year, perhaps since the advent of Thatcherism in 1979. It avoided the pitfalls Edinburgh born and educated Blair used to regularly get into coming north, who was often seen as hectoring and patronising Scottish audiences to the extent Alastair Campbell once called the Scots press ‘unreconstructed wankers’ (2).

Cameron reflected on a number of factors: he acknowledged his own party’s weak and perilous position in Scotland; he addressed that there was a Tory sentiment and self-interest in parts which said why don’t we cast off Scotland and had visions of ruling England forever; and he conceded that who he was personally, a privileged Englishman coming north with the mission of persuasion, just might be counter-productive.

With all that he did convey a sense of the tapestry of Scotland as a rich, diverse, historic country, of the many cultures, traditions and places which live and thrive in this nation. He invoked that he would ‘fight head, heart and soul’ to maintain the union that is the United Kingdom. At the heart of the speech, Cameron proposed that the Scots should vote ‘no’ to independence, and in return would be offered more substantial powers from Westminster. He put it:

…  let me say something else about devolution.

That doesn’t have to be the end of the road.

When the referendum on independence is over, I am open to looking at how the devolved settlement can be improved further.

And yes, that means considering what further powers could be devolved.

But that must be a question for after the referendum, when Scotland has made its choice about the fundamental question of independence. (3)

This represents an important shift on the part of Cameron who only a few weeks ago was posing Scotland’s choice in stark terms. It was then independence versus the status quo; Scotland having increased financial powers was ‘inconsistent’ with remaining in the union, and a unified tax and benefit system was at the ‘heart’ of the UK (4). All that has changed.

Now Cameron has began to mark out a more strategic approach which still has high risks. It does carry memories of 1979 and Alec Douglas Home on the eve of the first devolution referendum inviting Scots to vote ‘no’ in the safety that the Tories in government would bring forward better devolution proposals; none came but it did aid the ‘no’ vote. And then there is the issue of the substance. What ‘further powers’ are being talked about and could be considered; Cameron and company are going to have to come clean, get into detail, and acknowledge that the current Scotland Bill going through Parliament based on narrow, limited fiscal autonomy is flawed and inadequate.

As an aside, but an important one, this marks an evolution in the pro-union case which has provided particularly confusing for Labour. Margaret Curran, Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland responding to Cameron’s speech on ‘Radio 4’ found herself caught between her mutual loathing of Tories and Nats (5). In the 24 hours since Cameron’s speech no substantial Labour response has emerged, only silence.

The Cameron-Salmond dynamic and the interplay between the UK and Scottish Governments is part of an elaborate, serious dance. The prize is Scottish independence or the maintenance of the union, but for the moment the main disagreement has centred on process, and the UK Government insisting on one single, simple ‘Yes/No’ question on independence, and the Scottish Government holding out for the prospect of a two vote question, and including on the ballot paper, full fiscal autonomy or what is unattractively called ‘devo max’.

This is all part of that complex dance and calculations. This is politics as positioning. The SNP Government were elected on a mandate to hold an independence referendum, but seem reluctant to literally implement it. Instead, they seem to want to park themselves on the side of majority Scots opinion and support for more powers. The UK Government would in opening the doors to ‘further powers’ be moving towards a ‘devo max’ position, but want to make the choice black and white as it thinks it has more chance of decisively winning.

Scotland of course, or most of Scotland does not trust Tories or Tory Prime Ministers for good reasons. However, there also has to be a limit to how far we stereotype, caricature and don’t listen to Tories, particularly when they happen to be the Prime Minister. It doesn’t mean we should blindly take what they say on face value, but the perennial Tory bogeyman coming north to attack the weak and vulnerable doesn’t always help clear Scots thinking.

How do we have several Scottish Conversations at once?

The next two and half years are going to demand several levels of conversation and activity in Scotland. First, the SNP and pro-self-government forces are going to have to define independence. In so doing, they are going to have to put more detail on it than the risk free, safety first SNP strategy which has so far begged the question: what difference will it make?

Second, pro-union forces have to offer a vision of ‘devo max’ and a reformed union. They will have to do this before the independence vote in autumn 2014 and come up with a timescale for implementing reform after the vote, making it public and committing to it pre-vote. Otherwise many Scots are going to see the Cameron gambit as the ghost of 1979 and Alec Douglas-Home.

Third, the rest of Scotland has to concentrate on wider change and what difference this can make to the challenges facing society. This has to involve a more diverse, dynamic array of players than the Potemkin village of ‘civic Scotland’ which has so far emerged, and which entails the leaders of the voluntary sector and trade union movement. And Scotland really for all the mythology of ‘popular sovereignty’ has to come up with better expressions of it than top-heavy Commissions and Conventions, made up of the great and good.

There are also pitfalls to avoid on both sides. One particular obstacle is bitter, abrasive unionism of a Labour variety seen in full flush this week in the House of Commons Scottish Affairs Select Committee chaired by combative anti-SNP Labour MP Ian Davidson, whose report, ‘The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: Unanswered Questions’ was as bad as it sounded (6). All sorts of terrible things might happen in an independent Scotland it posed: no NHS, BBC, Royal Mail or even, truth be told, ‘Sunday Times Wine Club’. That surely put paid to nationalist dreams!

On a more serious level and a starter for debate, Cameron said, ‘The union helps to make Scotland stronger, safer, richer and fairer’ (7). This seems a good basis for the beginning of a Scottish conservation(s).  We could begin to look at the Scotland of today, and address the realities of Scottish society, and assess how Scotland measures up to these four areas.

Is Scotland really made ‘stronger, safer, richer and fairer’ in the union of today? And how would self-government and independence change and transform each of these?

This is something both unionists and nationalists until now have been rather silent and evasive on. Instead, both have enjoyed getting rather excited talking about abstracts, absolutes and fantasies, both positive and negative in their imaginations.

We need the Scottish debate to go beyond narrow constitutionalism into citizenship in the widest sense, economic, social, cultural and political. Cameron’s four point assessment of the benefits of the union offers a start. A stronger Scotland because of the UK’s post-imperial role in a variety of institutions; do we really believe that? A safer Scotland because of the UK’s defence and foreign policy commitments; that is a tough argument to make. A richer Scotland because of the transfers across the UK; another very difficult call. And the idea of a more fair Scotland because of the union; in the fourth most unequal society in the developed world, and most unequal country in Western Europe apart from Portugal (8).

This is the terrain David Cameron has identified as the critical areas to debate the future of the union. This has to involve a wider debate and imagination than just the absolutes of unionism versus nationalism, for underneath all this is Scotland’s explicit dissatisfaction with market fundamentalism and vandalism and a quiet, determined desire for a different, progressive, communitarianism, and distrust of the ideas and motivations of the British state. That Scottish sentiment has to find voice and form in the next two years and aid making this debate and choice a meaningful, as well as historic one.

Notes

1. Joyce Macmillan, ‘Cameron grasps the thistle at last’, The Scotsman, February 17^th 2012, http://www.scotsman.com/news/joyce_mcmillan_david_cameron_grasps_the_thistle_at_last_1_2121705

2. Murray Ritchie, Scotland Reclaimed: The Inside Story of Scotland’s First Democratic Parliamentary Election, Saltire Society 2000, p. 43.

3. David Cameron, ‘David Cameron’s Speech in Edinburgh on Scottish Independence’, Total Politics, February 16^th 2012, emphasis in the original, http://www.totalpolitics.com/speeches/devolved-politics/devolution/298767/david-camerons-speech-in-edinburgh-on-scottish-independence.thtml

4. Eddie Barnes, ‘No further tax powers for Scotland, says David Cameron’, Scotland on Sunday, January 29^th 2012, http://www.scotsman.com/scotland-on-sunday/politics/no_further_tax_powers_for_scotland_says_david_cameron_1_2084365

5. PM, BBC Radio 4, February 16^th 2012.

6. Scottish Affairs Select Committee, The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: Unanswered Questions, House of Commons, February 15^th 2012, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmscotaf/1806/180602.htm

7. Cameron, op. cit.

8. Danny Dorling, Fair Play: A Daniel Dorling Reader on Social Justice, Policy Press 2011.

A weekend of politics, culture and ideas …. And fun!

Friday March 23^rd-Sunday March 25^th
The Ceilidh Place, Ullapool

The Independence Weekend

Friday March 23^rd

8.15pm Welcome

Gerry Hassan and Jean Urquhart

Scottish Independence: The Big Debate

James Mitchell, Professor of Government, Strathclyde University, co-author, The SNP: Transition to Power

Saturday March 24th

10.15-11.30am The Scotland of Past and Present

Ian Jack, The Guardian

11.45am-1.00pm What is Independence in an Age of Interdependence?

Neil Walker, editor, Neil MacCormick’s Scotland; Edinburgh University

1.00pm-2.15pm Lunch

2.15-3.30pm The Economics of Self-Government

Stephen Boyd, STUC and Katherine Trebeck, Oxfam Scotland

3.45-5.00pm What is Social Justice Scotland?

Dave Watson, Unison Scotland and Marsha Scott, ENGENDER

8.30-10.00pm Evening Film: You’ve Been Trumped

Anthony Baxter introduces his award winning film

Sunday March 25th

10.30-11.45am The Nuclear Question: Trident and the Scottish Dimension

William Walker, co-author, ‘Uncharted Waters’; St. Andrews University

11.45-1.00pm What is ‘Civic Scotland’ and its Role in the Great Debate?

Martin Sime, SCVO and Kate Caskie, Victim Support Scotland

Places are limited! So book early to avoid disappointment!

A weekend ticket £60 Individual sessions £8

To book tickets please phone: The Ceilidh Place Reception 01854-612103

Accomodation available from £25 per person per nite

Gerry Hassan

The Scotsman, February 11th 2012

The Scottish suicide figures reported in ‘The Scotsman’ this week illustrate that we have a deep, challenging set of problems as a society.

‘British Journal of Psychiatry’ research revealed that the Scottish male suicide rate was 31 per 100,000 compared to 17 per 100,000 south of the border. It showed an increasing problem with 15-34 year old men in particular.

This alarming story can be used to suggest something pre-determined about Scotland, painting a predictable picture about Scottish society and lifestyles with negative and damaging connotations.

The reality is complex. Alana Atkinson, head of the Choose Life anti-strategy strategy pointed out that there has been a 14% decline in the number of people committing suicide in the last nine years.

There is a positive story in this, of Scottish progress and saving lives, as well as a more worrying account, of a widening gap between Scotland and England, along with the suicide rates of specific groups, such as young men.

The journal article suggested that the reasons for the gap between the two nations might be found in socio-economic factors such as deprivation, unemployment and insecurity, along with lifestyle behaviours such as drinking and drug taking. Atkinson commented that, ‘We can’t say for sure why there continues to be more suicide in Scotland than the rest of the UK.’

Different national cultures and experiences affect suicide rates. The highest suicide rate in the world per head according to the World Health Organisation (WHO) is Lithuania, and six of the top ten nations are former Soviet countries. There is a Nordic effect. Nordic countries have high suicide rates; WHO figures put Finland 15^th in the world per head, Sweden (30^th), Norway (34^th), Denmark (35^th) and Iceland (39^th); the UK ranked 61^st.

We know the turbulent changes that post-Soviet societies have been through with their ‘shock therapy’ structural changes and mass privatisations. We can also factor in the Nordic experience of their climates and lack of sunlight.

There needs to be accurate, reasoned coverage of these challenging issues which avoids sensationalism and simplification. Public health research has identified ‘the Glasgow effect’ and wider ‘Scottish effect’ which shows that many poor health outcomes from life expectancy to inequalities are not just about poverty and socio-economic factors.

‘The Glasgow effect’ has attracted international interest because the nature of health in Scotland’s biggest city is just in parts so appalling and shaming on all of us. However, ‘the Scottish effect’ also needs to be not forgotten, charting as it does the discrepancy between Scotland and England since 1981 in relation to mortality, and posing that this is not just about class and material factors.

Researchers have surmised that the missing factors at a Scottish level are likely to be about culture and the psychological effect of deindustrialisation on our society, the cumulative collective harm inflicted on us by those huge changes of 30 years ago which parts of Scotland, individuals, places and communities, have never since recovered from.

It is possible that a similar set of effects may be found with Scotland’s suicide figures, with the gap between Scotland and England being shaped by more than simple socio-economic factors and lifestyle choices which can be more easily measured.

Maybe the way we talk about these fundamental issues does not help. I was struck upon looking at ‘The Scotsman’ online comments in relation to the paper’s coverage of the Scots suicide rates that many had been moderated and deleted. It was clear from the comments remaining that these opinions were simplistic and determinist about why we have such problems.

Most were from people making sweeping, over the top observations about Scotland and its relationship with England holding this responsible for our suicide rate and suggesting that political change and from some, that independence would change this.

Two observations flow from this. First, we cannot make simple assumptions about Scotland and how it gets on with England in relation to this area. Yet at the same time Scotland’s relationship with England could possibly have some kind of impact negatively on some people in terms of their well-being and feelings of powerlessness. That though is a set of issues which needs to be handled and expressed with the utmost sensitivity.

Second, the sort of victimhood and persecution complex remarks displayed by some exasperate the problem because they deny nuance and subtlety. Perhaps even more importantly they close down and silence the human element. In amongst the deleted comments, there were powerful, brave, honest accounts of families who have lost a close loved one, a partner, brother, sister and child.

This is the Scotland we need to give voice to. While government and voluntary services matter and have to have proper funding, part of the problem is cultural, and part of the solution is cultural.

We have long needed to have a cultural revolution in Scotland, of opening up, shaking up and loose Scottish society, institutions and attitudes, and become a bit more liberated, liberal and less closed. The truth is that in the last couple of decades we have actually come a long way from the repressed, straightjacket society which many of us grew up with and which affected our childhoods, families and friends.

This was a Scotland of telling people off but not talking about emotions, relationships, hurt, doubt and love. There was a religious propensity not to articulate these issues, but there was also a wider Scottish stoicism born of some of the huge challenges people faced in large parts of the country such as the widespread poverty of the 19^th and early part of the 20^th century.

This is a world which is slowly fading and weakening, but we have still to uncritically and unapologetically embrace a different way of being, of saying it is alright to be vulnerable, to cry, to show you have doubts or need help and advice.

There is the challenge for some Scottish men, many of whom have not had the insight, skills or desire to be open, or admit they might need support. While many think this is about older Scots men, the figures show that for a variety of reasons, young men are one of the groups most struggling. We were once a society shaped by a certain granite masculinity and men as heroes and warriors; now it is a bit less clear.

We have to embrace the multi-faceted nature of modern life as a cause for celebration as well as a challenge. Some Scots still want to see the world in simple terms, and overstress the role of politics and political change as the solution, rather than look deeper.

Somehow after the retreat of religion, the task is to create our own Scots self-help guide to emotional literacy, of what it means to be a contemporary Scottish man and woman in today’s world.

Gerry Hassan

The Scotsman, February 4th 2012

Human beings have a need to associate, to feel they belong and to be part of wider groupings.

We all recognise this, but we also know some of the limits: the power and negativity of being in a gang, tribe or group, of including and excluding.

In my life many things have defined how I see myself and how I interpret the world: various values, philosophies, labels and outlooks, from politics to culture to of course, football.

I used to define myself as a left-winger and as part of the universalist left project which sought to bring emancipation across the globe. I was also a member of the British left and Scottish left.

Gradually one by one these definitions began to mean less to me; the British left waned, while the Scottish left, like everywhere retreated and diluted. One day, a couple of years ago in a public conversation with 1960s radical Tariq Ali, I realised that I thought it pointless to continue defining myself as a left-winger.

I recognised that the challenges the planet faces ecologically and in the limits to growth, along with the absence of a vibrant left in most Western democracies, has reduced the term mostly to an act of faith. It felt a liberation, but also a transgression.

Then came thinking of myself as a Scottish nationalist. Part of politically growing up in 1980s Scotland was the experience of Thatcherism, and that along with the poll tax and reading Tom Nairn made me a nationalist. But I now find myself more and more feeling that nationalism isn’t the force which will reshape our future, and while I see myself as sympathetic to many of its goals, sitting outside it. Emotionally I am happy to note the power of nationalism, but intellectually I think we need something else.

And crucial to my self-identity is football and the team I support, Dundee United. I now realise that while I still support United, and it hurts in a small way when they lose, I don’t do so in a tribal way. Instead, I feel for nearly all of Scotland’s clubs and their supporters, outwith the distortions of ‘the Old Firm’.

What I have come to realise is that the names and labels I have used to define myself are no longer how I choose to think of myself. And from this I reflect on the state of debate in Scotland.

The current constitutional debate is framed by the forces of unionism versus nationalism, and so misses most of Scotland out; it amplifies the power and exclusion of name-calling and labels.

The SNP strategy seems to be to present independence as risk-free as is possible by removing radicalism and uncertainty and emphasising continuity whether it be the Crown or currency. In so doing this does not answer the crucial question: what difference will it make to Scotland as a society?

Similarly the unionist campaign has shown itself fraught, brittle and seemingly unable or unwilling to make the positive case for the union and how our society has been nourished in the past, and could be in the future by the union. Without this the union case seems to be the bastion of the last true romantic nationalists, defending a fantasyland UK which doesn’t exist in reality.

Now before I get brickbats from either camp, what the best of each side uses their argument for is as a proxy to believe it is a means to a better Scotland. But at the same time both are silent about that better Scotland.

That’s the real Scotland we need to bring to the fore from the implicit to the explicit, and get past the fixation with process and taking about abstracts, combined with the self-interest of parts of institutional Scotland to keep things as they are.

The real debate would address some fundamentals. It would challenge the economic growth fetish mainstream politics is addicted to. It would talk about the difficult choices we need to make as a society about the environment, public services, demographics and more, and the balance between short-term populism and long-term gain. And it would bring to the fore the power of markets and global capital, and the collusion of most politicians with market fundamentalism. How can we create a society which isn’t defined by professional institutional capture in public services, but also doesn’t hand them over to corporate capture?

Then there is the debate about the distributional consequences of the public decisions we make. More profoundly we have to question the innate assumption across most of society that we are on the right track to a better, fairer Scotland.

Are we really? If so how can we be sure, and shouldn’t we begin to exhibit a small bit of self-criticism rather than self-congratulation?

Such a debate would address who has authority, power and speaks in our name, and how a future Scotland, independent or not, might begin to shake this up and change things. And it would not put all its faith in politics or politicians, but have a wider idea of change.

This debate has to be about a different Scotland, about fleshing out what a better Scotland would look like, what its values are, and how we get there.

This needs many of us to raise our voices and transcend thinking of Scotland as defined by labels, as ‘them’ and ‘us’, friends and enemies.

We should welcome the recent ‘civic Scotland’ decision not to back ‘devo max’ and more process discussions, and attempt to open up a debate about Scotland’s future.

They cannot do it on their own, as they don’t have the resources or mandate. A deeper point would be whether institutional public Scotland has the capacity and confidence to quietly question its own role and self-interest in the maintenance of the settled society which has defined Scotland for as long as most of us can remember.

Why does Scotland remain this rather complacent, undynamic society which does not seem interested in asking itself difficult questions? Part of the answer is that the professional bodies and gatekeepers of the public realm have all done rather well out of the status quo, of talking social democracy, while looking after themselves.

Scotland hasn’t shown any signs of wanting to shake itself out of this illusion, under the good times of devolution’s first decade, under Labour or SNP. This though is the difficult debate we need to begin to make real change in our nation and the constitutional debate relevant. The question is who will dare to raise their heads, challenge the way things are, and speak for a better Scotland?

Gerry Hassan

The Scotsman, January 28th 2012

The Scottish Government has announced its suggested question for the forthcoming referendum, ‘Do you agree that Scotland should be an independent country?’

At the same time it has suggested that ‘civic Scotland’ might like to organise, define itself and the idea of ‘devo max’, and ask a second question.

This sounds attractive on first hearing. Two questions would allow ‘devo max’ to be on the ballot paper reflecting some argue where the majority or the largest group of public opinion, currently sits. It would allow us to more easily avoid a potentially divisive debate on ‘Yes/No’ on independence versus the status quo, and sidestep the pains and pitfalls of the black and white tribalism which still characterises too much of Scotland.

Sadly for advocates of a two-vote referendum their arguments do not convince, and are actually a hinder to proper democratic deliberations.

Take the disadvantages of a two-vote question. First, it does not aid clarity or decision making. People have to know the choices they are voting on and understand them in a way which isn’t the preserve of the political anorak or obsessives. Having two votes does not aid the public coming to a considered decision of the options after a clear debate.

Then there are problems with who defines ‘devo max’ and then implements it. ‘Devo max’ makes the mistake of assuming the Scots can just follow on from the Scotland Act 1998, unilaterally rewriting the British constitution, further unbalancing asymmetrical devolution, and repatriating powers to Scotland. The 1998 Act followed nearly a century of debate and a gradual build-up and head of steam of support, as well as British goodwill. We cannot rely on this forever; the latter in particular cannot be assumed to be a constant.

The case for a one question referendum is much more straightforward. A one-vote ballot enhances debate and clarity. It allows voters to understand the proposition on offer, and makes much more certain a clear, simple decision where one side wins a majority of opinion.

‘Devo max’ implies a pan-UK set of reforms, establishing common ground and objectives across UK reformers, and could take years. It is not a simple path.

Independence (give or take all the known variables) is a known quality. As Alex Salmond constantly cites there were 50 nation states in 1945 and now there are 193; approximately 50 or so of those have emerged from the rubicon of London rule. None have come back.

There have been 12,000 referendums in the world; 98% of these have been straightforward binary choices. Of the 200 plus multi-option referendums most have dealt with local or smaller issues not the big questions of statecraft. One of the most interesting was the 1920 vote which followed the Temperance (Scotland) Act 1913. This was billed in the press as a ‘national vote’, but was made up of over 550 local ballots in the latter half of 1920. The options offered were full licence, restricted licence and no licence, with few areas opting for the latter. This was Scotland’s first and only multi-option referendum run at ward level – an interesting precedent, but about a much less important issue than independence.

There have been ten multi-option referendums; seven of these have failed to record a majority. A salutary example is offered by Puerto Rico and its debates between independence, becoming a US state, and the status quo. It has had three multi-option votes and has yet to reach a conclusive vote.

Comparisons between a two-vote question today and 1997 are spurious. We need to remember that despite the two questions then they were linked and formed a binary choice. The main choice was between a Parliament with tax raising powers and no Parliament; a third, less popular option existed of a Parliament with no tax raising powers.

There were two campaigns and arguments in 1997. Most voters thought of the debate in this way and voted accordingly. That is a very different proposition from ‘devo max’ and independence.

There is a seemingly powerful argument which emphasises that keeping ‘devo max’ off the ballot paper disenfranchises the views of hundreds of thousands of voters. This sounds superficially convincing.

However the opposite is true. Putting ‘devo max’ on the ballot disenfranchises potentially many more, possibly many more voters, by over-complicating matters.

It isn’t an accident that those who have enmeshed themselves in such matters for the common good, public citizens such as Nigel Smith, who set up the ‘Yes, Yes’ 1997 devolution campaign, and Quintin Oliver, organiser of the pro-Good Friday Agreement (GFA), both make the case for a one question vote and are against two votes.

Smith views, from his insider experience of 1997, that Scotland’s referendum then was about devolution and getting the SNP to agree to take independence out of the debate. He now believes that nearly a generation later this is Scotland’s independence vote. And that equally we need to take devolution out of the 2014 equation.

All of the parties and players in this debate are engaging in positioning, posturing and making hard calculations: the Scottish Government, the unionist parties in Scotland, the UK Government, and the self-defined, self-appointed forces of ‘civic Scotland’.

Two vote supporters worry about what happens if Scotland votes against independence and sense a déjà vu feeling with our politics returning to the dark times and long hangover of Scotland post-1979.

Then anti-devolution forces led by Alec Douglas-Hume argued that a ‘No’ vote wasn’t a vote against devolution and that the Tories would come up with a better set of devolution proposals. Once elected in 1979 the Tories turned their backs on this promise which had swayed many votes in the referendum.

This is a false fear. Scotland is a very different place and nation from 1979. The independence debate will change Scotland. The two most probable options are that, firstly and most straightforward, Scotland votes for and becomes independent; secondly, it achieves a high independence vote but loses the referendum.

The most likely outcome of the second would not be a return to some sad echo of 1979 and the end of the debate. Instead, a high independence vote would invite the British political classes and pro-union forces, if they wish to continue the UK to come up with meaningful reforms and substantial devolution.

We need to have simplicity, clarity and debate and have an uncontested, collective decision that we can all recognise and agree to whatever our opinions. It is that simple and important.

This is a historic, defining moment for all Scotland. It is above all most importantly, a democratic moment. Let’s do it right.

Gerry Hassan

Open Democracy, January 25th 2012

January 25^th 2012, Burns Night, will be remembered as a historic, watershed day for Scotland and the UK.

Alex Salmond announced to the Scottish Parliament his government’s proposed question for the autumn 2014 referendum on Scottish independence, ‘Do you agree that Scotland should be an independent country?’ This was he said ‘short, straightforward and clear’ (1).

The Scottish Government consultation paper, ‘Your Scotland, Your Referendum’ (2) is a cogent, thoughtful document, offering the vision of a modern, progressive Scotland at ease with itself and its neighbours. Alex Salmond even states in his forward, ‘Scotland is not oppressed and we have no need to be liberated’ (3).

The ‘Braveheart’ Nationalism of the British State

Those are important words because of the caricatures of Scottish nationalism which its enemies have. This can be witnessed in the widespread misinterpretation of the most famous exchange in the film version of ‘Trainspotting’ where the main character Renton invokes that Scotland has been colonised but not by an oppressor you can respect, proclaiming that, ‘we, on the other hand, have been colonised by wankers’ (4).

This was meant by writer Irvine Welsh as satire of a certain, ahistorical take of the Scottish predicament, but sadly it has become the view of many unionists and non-nationalists of Scotland, its culture and nationalist movement.

This has seen such opinion buying into the ‘Braveheart’ stereotype of Scottish nationalism; of seeing the SNP and self-government as romantic, irrational, sentimental throwbacks and ultimately, anti-progressive and unmodern. It is a view which flies in the face of the realities of the modern SNP and wider Scottish nationalist movement (which are two different entities). Alex Massie, always a thoughtful, considered voice, understands this, writing:

This is not a give me liberty or give me death type of struggle, far from it. In general, you see, Salmond wants to strip emotion from the debate, not pour it onto the pyre. (5)

A strange switch has happened in which the SNP have become thoughtful, pragmatic nationalists as far as you could imagine from ‘Braveheart’ and ‘Trainspotting’ sentiment. Instead, the romantic, fantasyland nationalists are those defending the British state and Westminster world: Gordon Brown, David Cameron and the unionist parties in Scotland.

They are romantic nationalists because they are letting their emotional attachment to the idea of the UK drive how they think of things. They tell themselves and the rest of us a selective, implausible, sanitised version of British history where we only did good things: brought ‘civilisation’ to the Empire, abolished slavery and beat the Nazis, and never address the complexities, nuances and darkside of having been an imperial power. In short, the new romantic nationalists defend an idealised, fictionalised United Kingdom, a world of in the words of Michael Moore, Lib Dem Secretary of State for Scotland, ‘a generous welfare state’ (6); the parallel universe of Gordon Brown’s land of liberty, tolerance and dissent (7). Alex Massie notes this significant change, commenting that ‘increasingly it is Unionism that tugs the heart’ (8).

Alex Salmond’s Hugo Young Memorial Lecture was one part of the choreographed bigger picture that is SNP strategy (9). Salmond had many audiences to address in this, the most important of which weren’t in the room, namely the domestic Scottish audience. SNP thinking, from al-Megrahi to Salmond’s visits to China and Dubai, is about Scotland taking a more prominent international profile and its place on the global stage.

There were different London Guardianista audiences, first, those who cannot get over the idea of an independent Scotland, gripe about nationalism, and feel threatened by the possibility that England may be left governed, god forbid by the English. Second, there are the others who Salmond can if not make common cause with, establish a dialogue with, many of whom see in Scotland an idealised centre-left community, i.e.: all that England and the UK isn’t. There is a bit of romanticism in that view too.

Salmond’s official story of progressive Scotland paints a powerful picture:

The Scottish Government’s policies attempt to protect many values which would be dear to any post-war social democrat in these isles. For example, we have promoted what we call a living wage – £7.20 an hour. And we have made a conscious decision to provide certain core universal services, rights or benefits, some of which are no longer prioritised by political leaders elsewhere – such as free university tuition, free prescriptions, free personal care for the elderly and a guarantee of no compulsory redundancies across the public sector. (10)

This is a selective account of social democratic Scotland, its achievements and how it feels which takes little account of the distributional consequences of these decisions. But as positioning it is masterful.

This moment requires a calmness and consideration to allow Scotland and the UK to have a reasoned debate and discussion. So far both the British political classes and media, and a large part of unionist opinion in Scotland has shown no indications that it has the capacity or qualities to do so.

The worst recent example of this wasn’t the tirades of Melanie Phillips or Simon Heffer, both of who preach to the converted about a ‘subsidy junkie Scotland’. Instead it comes from the BBC ‘journalist’ Jeremy Paxman, who has a track record in wearing his prejudice on his sleeve with regard to Scotland and Scottish independence.

Paxman’s ‘interview’ with Alex Salmond on ‘Newsnight’ was one characterised by Paxman’s condescending, metropolitan media elite disdain for Salmond and Scottish independence (11). Paxman was clearly indignant at the positivity and optimism of Salmond’s Hugo Young lecture, and his call for Scotland to be ‘a beacon for progressives’, using this to invite a comparison between Scotland and Zimbabwe, and then following this, to sink even lower, comparing Salmond and Mugabe.

The whole interview was shaped by Paxman’s scorn and Salmond’s good humour and grace, realising how this would play back home with domestic voters. Paxman went through issue after issue, the UK national debt, public spending, the gold reserves, and challenged Salmond to explain his sheer effrontery in daring to think that an independent Scotland was possible and viable. ‘How would an independent Scotland pay for the BBC license fee?’ he asked, throwing his famously contorted face which had once brought politicians as talented as Michael Howard and Tony Blair to account.

Paxmanesque arrogance, over-reach and machismo could be seen as a one off, unrepresentative of wider currents, but there is a tendency in large aspects of the British political classes to dismiss Scottish nationalism and the viability of Scottish independence in such brutal, demeaning terms.

This can be seen in the Scottish political environment whereby the unionist parties north of the border are still in denial about the SNP, let alone Scottish independence. After Salmond’s statement to the Scottish Parliament, Johann Lamont replied as leader of Scottish Labour, in a nippy, ungracious manner which in three minutes used the pejorative word ‘separatism’ three times; she warned Salmond not to take for granted that ‘he spoke for Scotland’ (12).

What this is influenced by is that the unionist parties are shaped by regarding the SNP as illegitimate, and not part of mainstream, moderate Scotland. Thus they regard the SNP Government as partisan and not the expression of the national will in the way governments the world are. This jaundiced view of the Nationalists makes Labour, Lib Dems and Tories come across as slightly crazed and myopic.

After Salmond’s announcement to the Parliament, he and Nicola Sturgeon, Deputy First Minister, went the short walk up the Royal Mile to Edinburgh Castle to take press questions on the referendum. This is a beautiful site in the heart of historic Edinburgh, and one well suited and used for such occasions, famously, Donald Dewar in July 1997 when he unveiled Labour’s White Paper on a Scottish Parliament. And yet given their partisan view of the SNP what did Labour and the Lib Dems say this time? Labour MSP Kezia Dugdale said, ‘Edinburgh Castle is a proud symbol of Scotland and belongs to all of the people of Scotland – not Alex Salmond or the SNP’; Willie Rennie, Scots Lib Dem leader offered the view that, ‘Things seem to have gone to the First Minister’s head. To use Scotland’s national monument for party political ends will just jar with people’ (13).

Evidence abounds of unionist parties not understanding the appeal of the SNP and independence. One of the well-worn dynamics as illustrated above is that Labour or other unionist politicians get so irritated by the words or actions of SNP politicians that they go over the top. Thus, Salmond’s claim that an independent Scotland could be ‘a progressive beacon’ caused Willie Bain, Labour MP to respond about Salmond that, ‘the man who said Scots didn’t mind Thatcherite economics, demanded lighter bank regulation and backed Fred Goodwin might not know what the word progressive means’ (14). The same observation could have been made of Gordon Brown.

A recent BBC ‘Question Time’ saw another revealing example. Nicola Sturgeon made the calm case for Scotland being able to debate and decide its constitutional future, an uncontroversial point, which caused Douglas Alexander, Labour Westminster frontbencher and former Cabinet minister, to retort that ‘we have had 40 years of debating the border issue’ (15). This was interesting language for no one senior in any Scottish party has ever called the independence debate, ‘the border issue’, a phrase which carries with it not just connotations of belittling, but sectarian strife and Northern Irish associations.

Beyond the Debate of ‘Two Tribes’

These are momentous, challenging times, filled with a mixture of excitement and bewilderment, hope and fear, depending on your political opinions. It is up to those of us who want a serious, mature debate appropriate for the occasion to challenge and demand from all Scotland’s and the UK political parties, media and political communities, that they act respectively and reach out and understand perspectives different from their own.

First, the pro-union forces have a legitimate argument to put about the merits of Scotland remaining in the union, but to do so and be heard, they need to argue a nuanced case which stresses the positives of remaining in the UK; what they must not do for their sake is retreat into their comfort zone of peddling fear and scaremongering stories about independence.

Second, even more crucially and basically, the union parties have to come to terms with the normalcy of the SNP and Scottish independence. The SNP and independence are part of the mainstream; they are not mavericks, eccentrics, wild men (and women), or even romantics – these are the unionist stereotypes of a Scottish nationalism which has long since passed away. The union forces need to stop girning and learnt to empathise and relate to the modern SNP in front of them which isn’t that different from them or the rest of Scotland (except that they happen to believe in independence).

Third, the political classes and parts of the media in Scotland and the UK need to stop using hackneyed language. Newspapers in Scotland regularly use the word ‘separatism’ without any qualification when this is a pejorative, partisan word. Labour, Lib Dem and Tory politicians love getting worked into a lather taking emotively of Scotland ‘being wrenched out of the UK’ as Nick Clegg did recently. This is the last stand of the romantic nationalists of the British state, and equally a sad story of how Lib Dems north and south of the border, have bought into the once Labour and Tory only Armageddon lexicon of seeing Scottish nationalism as the equivalent of a UK version of the Vietcong!

This brings us to the current political posturing between the Scottish and UK Governments over the nature of the independence question. The Scottish Government has stressed that it is open to two questions, one on independence and one on what is called ‘devo max’, sensing this is where most Scottish public opinion currently is. The UK Government and unionist opinion only want one question, thinking this offers them the best prospect of winning.

The debate between one and two questions is one that needs careful consideration by all sides rather than partisan calculations of what options are most likely to win. What is self-evident is that any referendum has to aid clarity, debate and decision on the part of the general public, and not be about the knowledge of the political cognoscenti. And offering up a multi-option referendum of ‘devo max’ and independence throws up huge challenges, asking for two political concepts to be defined, one of which, the former, has had no work done on it and at the moment has no institutional supporters beyond a self-proclaimed, self-selecting group who claim to speak for ‘civic Scotland’.

A two question referendum as is being currently mooted isn’t in any way comparable to 1997’s Scottish Parliament two vote question on a Parliament and its tax raising powers as it could be understood as a binary choice: for or against a Parliament. Such a proposed vote hasn’t really worked successfully anywhere in the world.

What equally matters is who calls the vote and who is seen to call it. This is about the politics and legitimacy of the vote rather than narrow legality. The best scenario is that the Scottish Government find agreement with the UK Government which allows the former to take the lead, call the vote and ask the question. A ‘Channel Four News’ poll found only 12% of Scots saw the UK Government as being best placed to call and run a referendum (16).

What such a figure reveals is that Scotland has already embraced a de facto independence of the mind, that Scottish politics are increasingly home grown, embrace a home rule politics, and Scottish voters wanting to see more and more domestic policy decisions and priorities made in Scotland by the Scottish Government, and have increasing questions of trust and legitimacy about the British Government’s role in Scottish domestic affairs (17).

All of this is part of a wider set of events which point to a quiet, peaceful and gradual revolution happening before our very eyes, of the emergence of a distinct Scottish public sphere and statehood, which is progressive, generous and about the collective future of its people, more than its past.

This is a Scottish story with major English, UK and European, as well as global dimensions. It is a social democratic story of a people and polity wishing to institutionalise their values and priorities. It is a story of the slow, painful decline of Britain, its state and statecraft, and how people see it. And it is as Anthony Barnett rightly argues the end of the argument for ‘a different kind of British state’ (18). Instead it is the beginning of the conversation of what kind of post-British identities will emerge, what kind of union and co-operation, and what sort of Britain, society and role in the world we want to envisage.

Notes

1. BBC Scotland News, ‘Scottish Independence: Referendum Question Set Out’, January 25^th 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-16702392

2. Scottish Government, Your Scotland, Your Referendum, Scottish Government 2012.

3. Foreword, op. cit.

4. Trainspotting, 1996, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0117951/quotes

5. Alex Massie, ‘Alex Salmond’s Inevitable Strategy’, Spectator Coffee House, January 25^th 2012, http://www.spectator.co.uk/alexmassie/7603815/alex-salmonds-inevitability-strategy.thtml

6. House of Commons, January 11^th 2012.

7. Gordon Brown, ‘Introduction’, in Matthew d’Ancona (ed.), Being British: The Search for the Values that Bind a Nation, Mainstream 2009.

8. Massie, op. cit.

9. Alex Salmond, Hugo Young Memorial Lecture, ‘Scotland’s Place in the World’, January 24^th 2012, http://www.snp.org/blog/post/2012/jan/hugo-young-lecture-scotlands-place-world

10. Ibid.

11. Newsnight, BBC Two, January 24^th 2012.

12. Scottish Parliament, January 25^th 2012.

13. The Scotsman, January 25^th 2012.

14. The Times, Scotland Edition, January 25^th 2012.

15. BBC Question Time, January 12^th 2012.

16. Channel Four News, January 16^th 2012.

17. Gerry Hassan, ‘The Beginning of the Break-up of Britain: The Consequences and Practicalities of Scottish Independence’, National Library of Iceland Lecture, January 20^th 2012, http://www.gerryhassan.com/blog/the-beginning-of-the-break-up-of-britain-the-consequences-and-potential-of-scottish-independence/

18. Anthony Barnett, ‘Time to Take Britain Out of Our Greatness’, Our Kingdom, January 25^th 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/anthony-barnett/time-to-take-britain-out-of-our-greatness

The Consequences and Potential of Scottish Independence

National Library of Iceland Lecture, January 20th 2012

1. Introduction

I am going to talk about the following:

• What is the United Kingdom?
• How did we get here: a short backstory
• Independence: Constitutionally
• Independence: Practically
• Independence: Politically
• Wider Context

2. What is the United Kingdom?

The UK is a state comprised of four nations.

Not technically speaking a nation, but a state. This is a situation which gets mainstream UK politicians into linguistic trouble all the time; Gordon Brown and his fascination with ‘Britishness’; David Cameron today.

UK is a hybrid – clearly not a federal state, but nor is it as is often claimed a unitary state.

The UK is now increasingly accepted in political science thinking as a union state – or even in some accounts as a state of unions (Bogdanor, 2009; Mitchell, 2009).

3. How Did We Get Here?

There is a Scottish, UK and wider global story about why we are where we are.

Two distinct, inter-related dynamics are at play in Scotland.

The first is the long-term Scottishing of Scottish administrative and political space (Fry, 1991).

In late Victorian Britain the administrative making of a distinct Scottish political sphere began with the creation of a separate government department, the Scottish Office.

This led to pressure for more political influence and the creation of the cabinet post of Secretary of State for Scotland and then its transformation under the tuterage of Tom Johnston who held the post from 1941-45 and then Willie Ross who occupied it from 1964-70 and 1974-76. Ross can now be seen as the last powerful figure of the old pre-devolution order before it began to break down under pressure and scrutiny (Hassan and Shaw, 2012).

There then followed greater demands for democracy – the Assembly devolution plans of 1979 – and then the Scottish devolution proposals and referendum in 1997 and subsequent establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999.

The second factor is what has happened to the Scottish economy over the 20^th century with huge changes in the early and middle years of the century as traditional industry and manufacturing such as shipbuilding, steel and mining went into serious decline. This happened elsewhere in the UK, but there was a particular concentration of these industries in Central and West Scotland.

This made the case for state intervention, planning and corporatist solutions even more attractive across society from the 1930s onwards, becoming even more explicit and entrenched in the post-1945 era (Knox, 1999). This led to a Scottish state which had far-reaching influence over society. It was a Scottish version of the British post-war state, but in time its Scottish characteristics would come to the fore (Finlay, 2004; Mitchell, 1996).

The combination of these two forces were given a flip by the right-wing drift of British politics post-1979 under Conservative Governments of Margaret Thatcher and then John Major (Torrance, 2009; Hassan, 2012).

Politically an element of this push in Scottish nationalism and social democracy, saw the Scottish dimension as much more a force for continuity than change – of continuing the settled order of 1945-75 – for the period of the post-war consensus, for social solidarity and collective citizenship. And this has been shaped by yearning for an age of security and palpable distrust with the trajectory of the British state.

4. Independence: Constitutionally

Firstly, Scotland is a nation.

Secondly, it can exercise the right to self-determination. The question is how and why.

First, the UK is a paradox; one of the most centralised states in Western Europe; where local government has no guarantee in law. And yet the unwritten nature of the British constitution – while allowing for abuse by governments – also allows for adaptability and flexibility.

British Governments have consistently said if Scotland wanted independence the UK would not stop it. Thatcher said this as PM; Malcolm Rifkind as her Secretary of State said the same; Donald Dewar passing what became the Scotland Act 1998 – said there could be ‘no glass ceiling’ on Scotland’s aspirations, i.e.: meaning no constitutional restriction on independence.

There are practicalities in the debate. ‘Constitutional matters’ are a ‘reserved matter in the Scotland Act 1998; this means that to some the subject of a Scottish independence referendum – can only be called by the UK Government.

This argues that the Scottish Government does not have the legal powers to call a referendum.

Then we get into the difference between a legally binding referendum and a consultative referendum; the UK Government calling the first; the Scottish Government only capable of the second.

This is constitutional literalism and illiteracy. The UK is meant to be a parliamentary sovereignty where Parliament is sovereign and all referendums merely advisory. When I studied British constitution at ‘A level’ you were taught that referendums as an expression of ‘the popular will’ were a threat to parliamentary sovereignty.

Thus this difference between UK and Scottish Governments and binding and advisory referendums is a diversion – for a struggle for power.

And this is as much about politics as legal interpretation. Scotland will have an independence referendum. It will be held by the Scottish Government, probably after an agreement with the UK Government.

It will be held in the autumn 2014 and it will be a momentous, historic occasion for Scotland and the UK, whatever the result. And whatever way Scotland votes, things will never be the same again in both perception and reality.

5. Independence: Practically

Scottish independence will involve a lot of negotiating and hard bargaining between Scotland and the rest of the UK.

Fundamentally, does Scottish independence create one new state or two new states? British politicians argue the former and that an independent Scotland is the one new state. But this ignores history and how the UK was created; as an equal partnership of Scotland and England in the Treaties of Union of 1706-7.

Two new states – Scotland and the rest of the UK – would have consequences for membership of the European Union, NATO, international bodies and more.

Real politick may come into play here; the rest of UK will attempt to assume in negotiations the position of the successor state (see Murkens et al, 2002).

Then we come to some of the detail of independence.

• Membership of the European Union.
• Currency; euro; British pound; Scottish pound.
• If British pound then there would be the issue of the role of the post-UK Treasury in an independent Scotland setting interest rates.
• National debt.
• Bank debts.
• North Sea Oil.
• Defence and in particular Trident.

Scotland has claim to 91% of North Sea Oil; and would take approximately 8% of the national debt. Already some centre-left English voices – such as Channel Four News – have decided that this is ‘unfair’ (Channel Four, January 11^th 2012).

6. Independence: Political Context

This is one of the most difficult areas to explore, namely, the political context of an independent Scotland and independent rest of UK.

Two prevalent arguments used by pro-union forces are:

First, Scotland is subsidised by the rest of UK and could not afford to go on its own.

Second, Scottish independence would condemn England to being governed by England – and so it goes produce perpetual Tory Governments.

Both are negative and about fear – which will have an important influence in the debate over the next few years.

And both might make you surmise that Tory and centre-right voices would be happier to see Scotland go – producing lower taxes and Tory Governments in England/rest of UK. Some right-wing opinion does think this. But most Tories don’t because politics and nationalism are much more subtle and nuanced than the above calculations.

It is also important that the above calculations may be wrong.

It is not clear that Scotland is subsidised once we take into account North Sea Oil and look at all tax and expenditure. On official UK figures the Scots represent 8.4% of the UK population and pay 9.4% of UK taxes – a gap of something like a £1,000 pounds for every Scottish person (New Statesman, November 6^th 2011).

More easily dismissed is that Tory Governments would run England forever. Tories have only won a majority of the vote once in post-war England, the same year they won a majority of the vote in Scotland (1955). They just happened to be very popular that year.

What aids Tory dominance in England is the First Past the Post electoral system and a centralised political system; change these and the Tories become one minority amongst many.

The politics of an independent Scotland would be influenced by the new political environment created. We can make a good guess they would be:

• Centre-left;
• Broadly social democratic;
• See a new interest in the North and Nordic matters (Smith, 2011).

But we are not as social democratic as we like to make out; nor are we that different in many public policy preferences from England.

Independence would be:

• A massive cultural, political and psychological shock to the Scottish system;
• Would call for a maturing of our public life and sphere;
• And the need for greater resources, creativity and imagination in how we think of policy, ideas and public matters.

7. Wider Context

I want to conclude by looking at the wider context.

Firstly, the nature of statehood and independence.

There are 193 nations which are full members of the United Nations; but there are numerous other arrangements.

Greenland – is not an independent state but is a self-governing nation.

Puerto Rico – is neither a state of the USA but nor is it an independent state.

Then there is – relevant to Scotland – the evolutionary development of the dominion status of the self-governing ‘white settler’ nations of the British Empire.

Australia, Canada and New Zealand all gradually progressed on the road from self-government to independence. It begs the question in each: when did Australia actually become Australia? When did it become independent? In the case of Canada the answer with regard to full independence is 1982.

Even the case of Ireland is instructive. It became independent as the Irish Free State in 1922, but remained a ‘dominion’ and part of the Empire. It was not until 1949 – twenty-seven years later – it became the Republic of Ireland – and withdrew from the Commonwealth.

Not ungermaine to our discussions – Ireland had the Irish pound until they entered the euro; pegged to the pound sterling for the first sixty years and then entering the European Monetary System in 1978.

All of these examples are relevant. Britain is a post-imperial state with an Empire State mentality at its core; a mentality, outlook and over-confidence in its political, economic and historic role.

And SNP policy on self-government was originally at the twilight of Empire in the 1940s for Scotland to assume ‘dominion status’ – self-government and an evolving relationship with the rest of the UK. A kind of post-nationalism before the term was invented (see Hassan, 2009; Mitchell et al, 2011).

If Scotland becomes independent there wont be an Independence Day in the way we traditionally understand it. What there wont be is a Hong Kong style closing ceremony with pomp and circumstance where the union flag is lowered over Edinburgh Castle and some royal figure oversees the end of British rule. It just wont be like that because British rule and the union flag were joint inventions of the Scots and English. It is even plausible that the union flag could continue flying in an independent Scotland.

What is happening is – as I flagged up at the start of this presentation – the continued evolution and development of a distinct Scottish political space and environment. This is one where increasingly the Scottish Government is seen as being the level of government most Scots want to run domestic services and policy. And in relation to an independence referendum only 12% of Scots want the UK Government to run and control this (Channel Four News, January 16^th 2012).

Finally, I want to acknowledge the context of globalisation, the power of capital and markets. The UK has in the last thirty years become an outlier and advocate for a view of the world associated with market deregulation and fundamentalism (Barnett and Hutton, 2011).  The City of London, legal and accountancy advice, business services and consultancy, the tax haven industry – these are just some of the manifestations of London as a ‘world city’ supporting a narrow elite view of the world (Shaxson, 2011); this has contributed to the UK becoming the fourth most unequal country in the developed world – after USA, Portugal and Singapore (Dorling, 2011).

The Scottish journey to statehood is a significant challenge to this; to British post-imperial delusions of pretensions to Great Powerism. It is part of the democratisation argument and movement of the UK – which aims to make common cause against the centralist state.

The Scottish self-government experience is about a small, social democratic nation attempting to find a degree of shared, partial autonomy and sovereignty in an age of globalisation and uncertainty; independence in an inter-dependent world: interindependence if you like.

In the coming months and years many of us in Scotland will want to conduct a public debate about independence and the union – in a climate which reflects some qualities and characteristics that you here in Iceland would understand.

This includes: that there are benefits and disadvantages of being independent; and advantages and disadvantages of being part of a bigger union; and that what the difference between these two visions amount to – are shades of gray rather than absolutes.

Autonomy is partial, fluid and liquid – and constantly compromised. But at the same time self-government, mission and purpose and institutionalising the values you share as a society matter.

There is a romantic side to this Scottish story and a practical one; an intrinsic and instrumental side to self-government. Both matter; but ultimately part of this is about who ‘we’ are, defining what that collective ‘we’ means, and giving voice to an account – which includes romance, folklore, identity and governance.

References

Barnett, A. and Hutton, W. (2011), ‘Global Capitalism and the British State’, in G. Hassan and R. Ilett (eds), Radical Scotland: Arguments for Self-Determination, Luath Press.

Bogdanor, V. (2009), The New British Constitution, Hart Publishing.

Dorling, D. (2011), Fair Play: The Daniel Dorling on Social Justice, Polity Press.

Finlay, R. (2004), Modern Scotland 1914-2000, Profile.

Fry, M. (1991), Patronage and Principle: A Political History of Modern Scotland, Aberdeen University Press.

Hassan, G. (ed.) (2009), The Modern SNP: From Protest to Power, Edinburgh University Press.

Hassan, G. (2012), ‘The Story of a Northern Rebellion and how it could remake Britain’, New Statesman, January 16^th, http://www.gerryhassan.com/uncategorized/the-story-of-a-northern-rebellion-and-how-it-could-remake-britain/

Hassan, G. and Shaw, E. (2012), The Strange Death of Labour Scotland, Edinburgh University Press.

Knox, W.W. (1999), Industrial Nation: Work, Culture and Society in Scotland 1800-Present, Edinburgh University Press.

Mitchell, J. (1996), Strategies for Self-Government: The Campaigns for a Scottish Parliament, Polygon.

Mitchell, J. (2009), Devolution in the UK, Manchester University Press.

Mitchell, J, Bennie, L. and Johns, R. (2011), The Scottish National Party: Transition to Power, Oxford University Press.

Murkens, J. E., with Jones, P. and Keating, M. (2002), Scottish Independence: A Practical Guide, Edinburgh University Press.

Shaxson, N. (2010), Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men Who Stole the World, Bodley Head.

Smith, L.C. (2011), The New North: The World in 2050, Profile Books.

Torrance, D. (2009), ‘We in Scotland’: Thatcherism in a Cold Climate, Birlinn.

Gerry Hassan

The Scotsman, January 21st 2012

‘Civic Scotland’ has been spotted these last few weeks, out in public, on manoeuvres, laying out their claims to be not forgotten in ‘the great debate’ about to ensue.

The official story of ‘civic Scotland’ matters because various people in the voluntary sector, trade unions and churches are articulating a very partial version of history to justify their place and stance now. And at the minimum we should, like every aspect of public life, put this and its claims under proper scrutiny.

‘Civic Scotland’ says that it created and gave expression to the Scottish Constitutional Convention, which in turn gave birth to the Parliament. This is myth and folklore.

For a start, the Convention wasn’t an adequate expression of civil society. It was an unrepresentative gathering of the great and good, of the political and administrative classes who had their noses by the Thatcher Government.

Local government, trade unions and churches claimed to represent Scottish society, but in this body and activity such claims need questioning. None of the afore-mentioned bodies engaged in any kind of participative or deliberative conversations. For all its invoking of ‘popular sovereignty’, the Convention was a curiously unimaginative body which engaged in top-down processes.

Then there was the myth propagated that this entity, the Convention, brought about the Parliament. The Convention mattered in influencing the debate, shifting Labour on home rule and electoral reform, and making people feel something was being done about how the Tories governed Scotland. But the flawed, final Convention plans weren’t what led to the Scotland Act 1998 which departed from it in important ways, the former listing devolved powers, while the latter took the more radical step of listing reserved powers to Westminster.

This short history lesson matters because in the way part of Scotland likes to revisit its greatest moments in a Groundhog Day style, some public figures are proposing that we repeat the trick again. That we trundle out ‘civic Scotland’ and create an umbrella entity to make the case for the third option, ‘devo max’.

First, there is of course politics in this. There is an SNP strategy which has been on going since the summer of 2010 which was then trying to stop Calman and its limited fiscal autonomy. This entailed a strategy of persuasion of civic Scottish bodies to take a stand against Calman and for more powers.

This approach seems to involve the SNP aspiring to become the voice of institutional Scotland in the way Labour once were, while hoping through this that this part of Scotland will in turn support it on more powers and eventually independence.

Second, the version of ‘civic Scotland’ in this equation seems to be as narrow and unimaginative as you could conceive. This is a small band of talking heads, led by SCVO, the STUC, the churches and Canon Kenyon Wright; all good bodies and people, but all insiders with access and clout.

This is not only bad history, but a rather dispiriting, unattractive reading of the Scotland of today and the possibilities of change. One of the worrying signs in this is the meaning of ‘civic society’ which seems to imply a gathering of like-minded, similar people who think they speak for the rest of us.

This is the Scotland of the Convention and the well-intentioned Civic Forum; people who mistook an echo chamber of agreement for a debate and difference.

This perspective paints a romantic, dewy-eyed view of Scotland, of a strong, empowered, varied civic society. And one which does not acknowledge complexity and the downside: of voluntary bodies reliant on the state for decreasing funding, often trapped doing the state’s bidding delivering their policies, targets and services, and squashed by the attentions of central and local government.

There is no addressing of what the term ‘civic Scotland’ means with its connotations of ‘civic society’ and why this is different from ‘civil society’. The former is surely a subset of the latter, small, more incestuous, homogeneous and middle class.

Instead, we have to reflect Scots civil society and do so in a way which doesn’t try and corral it all in one gathering and pretend we all face the same way and believe in consensus. That language and thinking is redolent of Scotland in the 1980s.

We also have to come to terms with how Scotland has changed over the last 20 years. Scotland has a Parliament, so a group of talking heads can’t talk or claim to represent Scotland. The managed society which characterised our public life for most of the 20^th century and further back has slowly begun to recede and be challenged.

This old Scotland was an ordered society, of security and solidarity, but also of deference and of not questioning authority whether it be ‘the cooncil’ or the doctor. It was a place where the telling phrase ‘settled will’ had another meaning, of stultification and suffocation of people’s potential. This was the Scotland of the union pre-devolution, of a state of undemocracy.

We should see the idea and myth of ‘civic Scotland’ as not a conservation society, but as a self-preservation society of elites and insiders, of adaptors and survivors who swayed that way with Labour and now are doing the same with the SNP.

Is this really the sum total of the imagination of the public life of Scotland? That every couple of decades we roll out a Convention or pseudo-People’s Forum and have a limited, notional expression of the popular will.

Why can’t we embrace the changing world of activism and campaigning we see all around us? Utilise the ideas of the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street, and encourage the voice of a disaffected public through Facebook, twitter and social media.

There is in Scotland a generation of young people as disconnected as elsewhere, worried about their prospect and future, and ‘civic Scotland’ and mainstream politics does not speak for them.

We need to bring a bit of unpredictability to the settled world of Scottish public life, encourage new voices, and notice the silences and omissions from the table of ‘civic Scotland’.

For to long we have been content with the grand gestures of ‘We are the People’ and talking inclusion, while presiding over one of the most bitterly divided societies in Western Europe. Wouldn’t it be great if to paraphrase the words of that aged old sage, Leonard Cohen, we could finally say, ‘Democracy is coming to Scotland’.